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On the Size and Growth of Government
Thomas A. Garrett and Russell M. Rhine
a private market operates efficiently; it should
not act to replace the market mechanism.
Various data clearly suggest that the size of
the federal government in the United States has
grown dramatically during the 20th century.4 One
measure of government growth is federal expen-
ditures per capita. The history of real (2000 dol-
lars) federal government expenditures per capita
from 1792 to 2004 is shown in Figure 1. This
growth did not occur gradually, however. In the
early years of the United States, the federal govern-
ment spent about $30 per person annually. By the
1910s, government expenditures per capita were
about $129, or slightly more than four times the
1792 level. In 2004, the federal government spent
$7,100 per capita, nearly 55 times more than was
spent per capita in the 1910s. Spending growth
did slow in the mid-1980s and actually decreased
E
conomists have long been divided on
the role of government in a society.1
John Maynard Keynes and John
Kenneth Galbraith have argued that an
economy needs to be continually fine-tuned by
an activist government to operate efficiently2:
Thus, as an economy grows, a growing govern-
ment is also necessary to correct private-sector
inefficiencies. This school of thought grew pri-
marily out of the Great Depression, when markets
seemed to fail and government intervention was
viewed as the means to restore economic stability.
Other 20th century economists, such as Frederick
von Hayek and Milton Friedman, have argued
that an activist government is the cause of eco-
nomic instability and inefficiencies in the private
sector.3 Government should exist to ensure that
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that are dominant in the public choice and political science literature. The theories are divided
into two categories: citizen-over-state theories and state-over-citizen theories. The relationship
between the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the timing of government growth is
also presented. It is likely that portions of each theory can explain government size and growth,
but the challenge facing economists is to develop a single unifying theory of government growth.
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1 The evolution of this debate is presented in Yergin and Stanislaw
(2002).
2 John Maynard Keynes’s book, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money, is one of the most influential economic books
of the 20th century. Keynes states the need for substantial increases
in government spending during times of economic contractions.
Similarly, John Kenneth Galbraith argued for an expansionary fiscal
policy to increase economic activity and employment.
3 Of the many publications of both these Nobel Prize–winning
economists, the most influential are Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom
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4 All data on federal, state and local government expenditures are
from the Office of Management and Budget (www.whitehouse.gov/
omb) and the U.S. Census Bureau.
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          in the mid-1990s. By the year 2000, however, per
capita spending increased once again.
It is clear from Figure 1 that spending on
national defense can have a substantial impact
on the level of government spending. Figure 2 is
a graph of total per capita expenditures with and
without defense spending over the period 1947-
2004. It is evident that the long-term growth in
total per capita government spending is not solely
a function of national defense. 
Federal spending has also increased relative
to gross domestic product (GDP) throughout much
of this country’s history, as seen in Figure 3.
Expanded government during World War II is
clearly evident in Figure 3, as is the slowdown
in government growth during the 1980s and 1990s.
Figure 1 shows that the federal government has
historically spent more per person each year, but
Figure 3 suggests that this growth in spending
has been less than the growth in GDP at the end
of the 20th century.
An examination of the components of federal
government spending provides insight into which
areas the government has increased activity.
Figure 4 plots several components of federal gov-
ernment spending per capita from 1947 to 2004.
Although total per capita spending increased
following World War II, several components of
federal government expenditures stayed relatively
constant or even decreased slightly over the next
50 years: physical resources (e.g., transportation,
energy), national defense, and “other functions”
(e.g., agriculture, general government, international
affairs). In fact, much of the reduction in federal
expenditures per person occurring in the mid- to
late 1990s can be attributed to a reduction in
national defense spending. However, spending
on national-debt net interest payments and human
resources grew substantially over the same period.
The dramatic increase in human resources that
occurred reflects the growth in Social Security
payments and the inception of entitlement pro-
grams such as Medicare (in 1965). 
Another measure of the size of the federal
government is the number of cabinet departments.
Eight cabinet departments were created from 1788
to 1952. Since 1953, there have been an additional
eight cabinet departments established. Table 1
provides a list of all executive cabinet departments
and the dates they were each established. One can
infer from Table 1 and Figure 1 that the increase
in per capita expenditures during the 20th century
was due to an increase in the physical size of
government as well as an increase in spending
by existing government agencies.
In addition to the increase in federal govern-
ment expenditures, state and local government
expenditures per capita have also increased since
World War II, as seen in Figure 5. Inflation-adjusted
expenditures per person were about $759 in 1948,
compared with over $4,300 per person in 2004.
The average annual growth rate in real per capita
state and local government expenditures was 3.2
percent, compared with an average annual growth
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Health and Human Services 1953





Environmental Protection Agency† 1990
Homeland Security 2002
NOTE: *The date refers to the Department of War; the Depart-
ment of Defense was officially created in 1949. The Department
of War (1789), the Department of the Navy (1798), the Depart-
ment of the Army (1947) and the Department of the Air Force
(1947) were all reorganized under the Department of Defense
in 1949. See www.dod.gov.
†Cabinet-level rank under George W. Bush;
see www.whitehouse.gov/government/cabinet.html.
SOURCE: Cabinet department websites.Garrett and Rhine
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Figure 4
Real Per Capital Federal Expenditures by Component: 1947-2004rate of 2.7 percent for real federal expenditures
per person. Total government expenditures per
person (federal + state + local) totaled $2,350 in
1948 and nearly $12,150 in 2004.
The data illustrated in Figures 1 through 5 pro-
vide convincing evidence that the size of govern-
ment in the United States has grown throughout
the 20th century.5 An important question asked
by economists and political scientists is why this
growth has occurred. This paper presents several
popular theories of government size and growth
that have received attention in the economics and
political science literature.6 Since government
and the citizenry are made up of individuals, all
theories of government considered here approach
the issue from a microeconomic perspective;
specifically, they consider the incentives of voters,
public officials, and the inherent inefficiencies
that may arise in a representative democracy. Note
that some theories are better suited to explain
government size and others to explain government
growth.
The theories of government size and growth
fall into two distinct categories. The first category
is citizen-over-state theories of government. These
theories begin with the premise that citizens
demand government programs and, as a republic,
the government is simply responding to the will
of the people. The other category is state-over-
citizen theories of government growth. Here, the
size of government is independent from citizen
demand and government grows because of inher-
ent inefficiencies in public sector activities and
incentives facing government bureaucrats. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the potential
Garrett and Rhine
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Real Per Capita State and Local Government Expenditures: 1948-2004
5 Another measure of government size is federal employment relative
to total employment. Plotting this series over time reveals that
federal employment is a diminishing share of total employment
throughout the 20th century. A closer inspection of the data reveals
that most of this decrease in federal employment is a result of a
reduction in defense employment, which suggests that the number
of federal government employees is not a good measure of the size
of the government because subcontractors complete much of their
work. For example, the federal government does not build military
aircrafts; they pay subcontractors like Lockheed-Martin to build
them. So, thousands of people working on the construction of air-
crafts at Lockheed-Martin receive their pay indirectly from the
federal government, and they are not included in government
employment figures. In 2004, Lockheed-Martin had sales of $35.5
billion. Nearly 80 percent of sales were to the U.S. Department of
Defense/Intelligence and Civil Government/Homeland Security
(www.lockheedmartin.com).
6 Kliesen (2003) discusses the increase in government size during
the 20th century.importance of the 16th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which allows the federal govern-
ment to tax wage and business income. As will
be discussed, the timing of the 16th Amendment
and the start of government growth may be more
than a coincidence.
CITIZEN-OVER-STATE THEORIES
OF GOVERNMENT SIZE AND
GROWTH
The citizen-over-state theories of government
size and growth begin with the premise that gov-
ernment growth occurs because citizen demand
for government programs has increased over time.
It will become evident here that the demand for
government can come from individual citizens
or a collection of citizens organized into special
interest groups. This section discusses three dis-
tinct citizen-over-state theories of government
size and growth.
The Government as a Provider of
Goods and a Reducer of Externalities
Voters decide which goods the government
will provide and which negative externalities the
government will correct.7 The tool economists
and other social scientists use to determine where
the government will intervene is the median voter
theorem. Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957 and
1961) rank voters by political ideology and place
the most conservative individual on the far right
and the most liberal on the far left. Assuming a
two-party system, the voters must choose the
conservative candidate or the liberal candidate.
Since the voter will choose the candidate with
the views closest to his or her own views, which-
ever candidate wins the median voter will have
a majority of votes and win the election.
An assumption of the median voter theorem
is the use of majority rule voting. Additional
assumptions are that citizens vote directly on
government spending issues and that government
spending is the only issue on the ballot. Thus, the
median voter determines the demand for publicly
provided goods, which is a function of income,
the relative price of public goods to private goods,
and tastes.
The price elasticity of demand for govern-
ment and the price of government both determine
whether government grows or contracts. Govern-
ment will grow if the demand for government is
price inelastic and the price of government
increases. In other words, if the price of govern-
ment goods or services increases and the quantity
demanded of the goods or services does not
decrease by a proportionate amount, total govern-
ment spending increases. The other possibility
for government growth is an elastic demand for
government and a falling price of government.
That is, if the price of government goods or services
decreases and the quantity demanded of the goods
or services increases by a more-than-proportionate
amount, total spending increases.
The literature presents evidence in support
of an increasing price and an inelastic demand
for government. Baumol (1967) addresses the
issue of relative private and public sector prices
in terms of government growth. He shows that the
increase in the price of the public sector goods
and services relative to the price of the private
sector goods and services is due to productivity
gains in manufacturing. Since most government
programs are services (i.e., national defense, edu-
cation, and police), they have not experienced
the same efficiency gains as manufacturing specifi-
cally and the private sector overall; thus, the rela-
tive price of public goods has been increasing.
Mueller (2003) presents additional evidence
of the Baumol (1967) effect in OECD countries.8
He found that 20 of the 25 OECD countries showed
the expected growth in government expenditures
as a percent of GDP from 1960 to 1995. Of the
five countries that did not increase government
expenditures by the amount predicted by the
Baumol effect, four of the five still increased to
some extent and only one decreased. It decreased
8 OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development: OECD countries are listed at www.oecd.org.
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7 A negative externality is a negative (costly) spillover from an activity
onto a nonconsenting third party. An example is pollution from a
factory that is dumped into a river and has an adverse affect on
everyone downstream.expenditures as a result of decreased defense
spending after the end of the Cold War.
In addition to the productivity differences,
Ferris and West (1999) found that wages in the
public sector, which contribute to the price of
government, are increasing faster than in the
private sector. They find evidence of this in the
salaries of unionized versus non-unionized public
school teachers. The near-monopoly nature of
publicly provided goods and services encourages
the creation of unions, and they will demand
higher wages. The government will appease the
unions and simply pass these costs onto the tax-
payers.
The remaining determinant that the literature
uses to help explain the government as a provider
of goods and services and reducer of externalities
is citizen tastes and preferences. Over time taste
for publicly provided goods and services changes
and subsequently so will the demand for these
goods and services. One such good is the redistri-
bution of income and wealth for insurance pur-
poses. Rodrik (1998) looks at the risk associated
with open economies and presents evidence to
support the hypothesis that the more open the
economy, the larger the government. Specifically,
he argues that the volatility of income and employ-
ment that corresponds with open economies is
an insurable risk. The government programs that
act as a form of insurance to protect workers are
social programs (i.e., unemployment and social
security).9
However, as pointed out by Mueller (2003), a
problem with Rodrik’s (1998) findings is that the
large social programs in the United States grew
at a time of significant slowdown in the domestic
economy—the Great Depression—not the
increased openness of the U.S. economy. Thus,
social insurance programs are meant to reduce
the risk of households’ income volatility due, at
least in part, to business cycles. The programs
also attempt to smooth cash flow over a citizen’s
lifetime and across income levels.
The Government as a Redistributor of
Income and Wealth
The second citizen-over-state theory of govern-
ment surmises that government serves as a redis-
tributor of income and wealth. All government
programs are seen as mechanisms for redistribu-
tion. Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981, 1983)
present a model where leisure is inversely related
to the fraction of total time worked, consumption
is inversely related to the tax rate and is positively
related to a lump-sum grant received from the
government, and income is positively related to
productivity. Their model produces a well-known
result—a higher level of productivity equates to
a higher level of income, and the higher income
increases consumption and well-being.
Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981, 1983) show
that individuals will demand the combination of
tax rates and lump sum payments that maximizes
their well being. Individuals with a lower level
of productivity, and subsequently a lower level
of income, will demand a higher tax rate and a
higher lump-sum payment from the government.
The extreme case is individuals that do not work
and pay no taxes; they will simply want to maxi-
mize their lump-sum payment and will demand
a higher tax rate than that demanded by those
individuals who are working. This model explains
the growth in government in part because, over
time, new entrants into the voting population
are lower income workers. These lower income
workers will cast votes for the candidate who
will levy higher taxes and increase the amount
of redistribution. 
Kristov, Lindert, and McClelland (1992)
explain that the amount of redistribution is based
on social affinity. The closer the middle class feels
to the poor, or the slower incomes are growing,
the greater the amount of redistribution. The
authors study the period immediately preceding
and during the Great Depression as support for
their claim. They explain that, when the economy
was expanding, Americans voted not to increase
taxes to fund relief for the poor. But, after the
economy changed directions in the 1930s, social
programs increased dramatically. Taxes on high
earners increased, and the number of programs
Garrett and Rhine
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9 Ex post, not all citizens will benefit from social programs, as sug-
gested by Garrett and Rhine (2005), which shows that less than 5
percent of 2003 retirees benefit from the Social Security system.
Ex ante, however, the social program is publicly provided insurance.that redistributed income and wealth increased
as well.
Peltzman (1980) explains that candidates
promise transfer payments to groups of citizens
in order to gain their support. If the distribution
of incomes over different socio- economic classes
is similar, then the candidate must offer a greater
amount of redistribution to gain supporters. With
a trend toward more evenly distributed incomes
in years prior to the Peltzman (1980) study, greater
redistribution by the federal government was
undertaken.
Interest Groups
Interest groups can increase the size of govern-
ment by organizing members and applying political
pressure more effectively than individual citizens
(Olson, 1965, and Moe, 1980). Examples of interest
groups mentioned frequently in the popular press
include the Sierra Club, the National Organization
of Women, and the National Rifle Association.
One can think of an interest group as an organized
collection of individual voters (or businesses)
having the same preference for a specific policy.
Through concentrated lobbying, an interest group
can obtain a desired policy that has direct benefits
for the interest group but the costs of the policy
are spread across millions of taxpayers. Elected
officials play a key role in this process as they
weigh the political costs and benefits of each
policy. Such disconnectedness between costs
and benefits will result in inefficient levels of
government expenditures—that is, the societal
costs of the policy will be greater than the societal
benefits.
Supply and demand analysis can be used to
model an interest group economy (McCormick
and Tollison, 1981). “Demanders” of a policy will
be those groups that can organize and lobby for,
say, $100 at a cost of less than $100. “Suppliers”
(individual tax-payers) are those for whom it
would cost more than $100 to lobby against losing
that $100.10 The incentives facing elected officials
are such that they will target unorganized suppliers
with low losses from any transfer while courting
demanders who are organized and active in the
political process. Thus, costs are spread across
many taxpayers but the benefits are concentrated
within the interest group. If too little or too much
wealth is transferred, the political process will
discipline the elected official at the polls.
Although economic theory can be used to
explain how interest groups operate in a political
market for transfers, economics has said little
about how interest groups form (Olson, 1965). In
fact, economic theory suggests that there would
be little or no interest group formation because
of the free-rider problem. Because the benefits of
lobbying are nonrival and nonexcludable, it is
rational for individuals who would benefit from
lobbying to free-ride.11 Despite a lack of theory
for interest group formation, economics has pro-
duced dozens of papers that provide theoretical
and empirical evidence on the link between
interest groups and the size of government.12
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) offer a
rational explanation for the inefficiency (costs >
benefits) of special interest projects. The authors
focus on distributive policies that concentrate
benefits within a geographic area and disperse
the costs (taxes) over all constituencies. In the
model of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, the
national constituency is divided into districts that
are each assumed to maximize its net benefits from
any redistributive project and have only one rep-
resentative. Because the district is only a fraction
of the national constituency, the cost of the project
is spread out over the entire constituency. Each
district does not take into account the costs that
are being placed on other constituencies when
evaluating its own benefits. Thus, because the
net benefits of a given project are overstated, the
11 There are several ways in which interest groups can, at least par-
tially, overcome the free-rider problem. One way is through coercion
or mandatory membership, such as in the case of labor unions and
state bar associations. Other interest groups may provide valuable
private benefits to members, such as publications and educational
material, at a relatively low cost of joining. The American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons (AARP) is an example. Political entrepre-
neurs can also overcome the free-rider problem. Examples include
many large corporations that have offices in Washington, D.C. The
employees of large corporations also serve as informal lobbyists.
12 See Ekelund and Tollison (2001) for a detailed overview of the
literature on interest group theory.
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10 As suggested by Mueller (2003), the term suppliers should be taken
loosely because individuals would only likely engage in the
transfer under coercion.project is larger than the efficient project size.
Furthermore, because local projects are larger
than the efficient level, the district’s representa-
tive has even greater interest in acquiring projects
that benefit his or her district.
Becker (1983) presents a theory of public poli-
cies that result from competition among special
interest groups (or “pressure groups” according
to Becker). Becker views political pressure as a
public good.13 An increase in interest group mem-
bership will increase pressure, but because pres-
sure is a public good, free-riding (by would-be
group members) will increase. Because free-riding
increases, so do the costs of implementing pres-
sure. Becker finds that efficiency in producing
pressure is partly determined by the costs of
controlling pressure—a greater control over free-
riding increases the amount of pressure. With
higher amounts of pressure, a special interest
group is able to acquire more benefits (lower taxes
or higher subsidies). Becker believes that effi-
ciency is improved not only by controlling the
free-rider problem, but also through the competi-
tion that occurs between tax groups and subsidy
groups that consider their losses via taxes or sub-
sidies. Therefore, interaction among competing
special interest groups increases the power of the
special interest lobby, and thus special interest
spending.14
Sobel (2001) provides empirical evidence on
the positive relationship between political action
committees (PACs) and federal government spend-
ing.15 He notes that the rise in federal government
spending during the 1970s and 1980s and the
subsequent slowdown in the 1990s parallel the
increase and eventual decrease in the number of
PACs over this same period. He finds that a 10
percent increase (decrease) in the number of PACs
in time t–1 is associated with a 1.07 to 1.57 per-
cent increase (decrease) in federal spending in
time t. However, one issue is whether the number
of registered PACs, as opposed to PAC member-
ship, accurately represents the scope and power
of the special interest lobby in the United States.
Although interest group theory may provide,
at least in part, a reasonable explanation for the
size of government, it is not without its theoretical
and empirical challenges.16 One issue is that of
causality. Specifically, does interest group activity
cause government spending, or do changes in the
level of government spending influence interest
group activity (Mueller and Murrell, 1985, 1986)?
Another issue mentioned earlier is that of interest
group formation. Although there are anecdotal
explanations as to how interest groups can over-
come the free-rider problem, such an idea has yet
to be incorporated into a reasonable economic
model. Finally, there is debate as to whether the
interest group theory is in fact a citizen-over-state
theory or a state-over-citizen theory given the
pivotal role that elected officials play in the link
between interest groups and government growth.
STATE-OVER-CITIZEN THEORIES
OF GOVERNMENT SIZE AND
GROWTH
The previous section discussed several citizen-
over-state theories of government size and growth.
Inherent in these theories is the idea that govern-
ment is demand driven—that is, government
size and growth occur because citizen demand
for government has increased. This demand for
government can come from individual citizens
or groups of citizens (the interest group theory),
with each party having a desire for some form of
a publicly provided good, externality reduction,
or redistribution of income.
The following section presents several theo-
ries of government growth that start from a
Garrett and Rhine
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16 Ekelund and Tollison (2001). 
13 A public good is nonrival (consumption by one person does not
deny consumption by others) and nonexcludable (no price mech-
anism exists to deny consumption). National defense is a classic
example of a public good.
14 Note a key difference between Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen
(1981) and Becker (1983): Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen believe
interest groups arise as a result of concentrated benefits and dis-
persed costs that follow from the existence of independent districts
(each district is an interest group), and it is this dispersion between
costs and benefits that leads to larger government. Becker, however,
believes that it is the competition among interacting interest groups
that increases the power of the special interest lobby, and thus
increases special interest spending.
15 A PAC is an organization whose goal is to raise campaign funds
for candidates seeking political office.completely opposite premise from the previous
theories—namely, that the size of government is
supply driven rather than demand driven. These
theories posit that the incentives facing public
officials and the nature of our representative form
of government provide an environment for govern-
ment growth to occur in the absence of citizen
demand. Government grows because of govern-
ment and its inherent inefficiencies, structure
(e.g., direct democracy versus a representative
democracy), and incentives facing public officials.
Appropriately, then, the following three theories
are classified as state-over-citizen theories of
government growth.
Bureaucracy Theory
Goods and services provided by the govern-
ment do not arise out of thin air, but rather they
must be created by a government agency. The
supply of government output, then, may be a
function not only of citizen demand (as the pre-
vious theories suggest), but also of the demand
of government bureaucrats. Niskanen’s (1971)
theory of bureaucracy postulates that government
bureaucrats maximize the size of their agencies’
budgets in accordance with their own preferences
and are able to do so because of the unique monop-
oly position of the bureaucrat. Because the bureau-
crat provides output in response to his or her own
personal preferences (e.g., the desire for salary,
prestige, power), it is possible that the size of the
bureaucrat’s budget will be greater than the budget
required to meet the demands of the citizenry.
An important point is that bureaucracy theory
does not deny the citizen demand models of
government discussed in the previous section,
but rather it suggests that bureaucrats can generate
budgets that are in excess of what citizen demand
warrants.
The ability of a bureaucrat to acquire a budget
that is greater than the efficient level is dependent
on several institutional assumptions (Niskanen,
1971, 2001). First, unlike private sector produc-
tion, the public sector does not produce a specific
number of units, but rather supplies a level of
activity. As a result, this creates a monitoring
problem for oversight agencies: It is difficult, if
not impossible, for monitors to accurately judge
the efficiency of production when no tangible or
countable unit of output is available. Second, the
monopoly nature of most bureaus shields them
from competitive pressures necessary for effi-
ciency and also denies funding agencies (Congress,
the executive branch) comparable information
on which to judge the efficiency of the bureau.
Third, only the bureau knows its true cost sched-
ule because bureau funding is provided by agents
external to the bureau. This provides an oppor-
tunity for bureaucrats to overstate their costs in
order to receive a larger budget. Finally, the
bureaucrat can make take-it-or-leave-it budget
proposals to the funding agency.
Niskanen (1971) shows that the bureaucrat
will maximize a budget subject to the constraint
that the budget must cover the costs of produc-
ing the good or service. The implication of the
model is that the bureau’s budget (and output) is
expanded beyond the point where the marginal
public benefits of the good or service equals the
bureau’s marginal costs of providing the good or
service.17
Although the model presents clear reasoning
on how a bureau can expand output and costs
beyond the efficient level, in reality many bureaus
cannot expand output beyond the level demanded
by the citizenry. Examples of this at the local level
include school districts and garbage collection:
School districts cannot educate more students
than those who are already attending school,
17 A simple formulation of Niskanen’s (1971) model of bureaucracy is:
• B = B(Q), where B is the bureau’s budget and Q is the perceived
output of the bureau. The funding agency is aware of this public 
benefit schedule, B(Q). It is assumed that B′ > 0 and B′′ < 0.
• C = C(Q), where C represents the bureau’s cost function, which 
is known only to the bureau. Also, C′ > 0 and C′′ > 0.
The bureaucrat is assumed to maximize his or her budget subject to
the constraint that the budget must cover the costs of producing Q.
Thus, the bureau’s objective function is
OB = B(Q) + λ(B(Q) – C(Q)).
Differentiating with respect to Q and λ and then rearranging terms
gives
(1) 
(2)  B(Q) = C(Q).
Mueller (2003, Chap. 16) provides a detailed analysis of bureaucracy
theory and presents extensions of the model presented here that
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than is available for disposal. Even in these cases,
however, a bureau may expand its budget beyond
the efficient level—not by providing output
beyond the efficient amount but by providing
the services at a higher cost than necessary.
There has been ample literature that has
compared the costs of public and private organi-
zations that provide similar services. The activities
or firms studied include, but are not limited to,
hospitals (Clarkson, 1972), refuse collection
(Bennett and Johnson, 1979, and Kemper and
Quigley, 1976), water utilities (Morgan, 1977)
and fire protection (Ahlbrandt, 1973). Mueller
(2003, Chap. 16) provides a summary of 70 studies
that examined the cost of public versus private
sector provision of identical services. In all but
five studies cited, the cost of public provision is
significantly greater than private provision, thus
lending support for the bureaucracy theory of
government.
However, the cost difference between private
and public organizations may simply be a result
of a lack of competitive pressure rather than direct
attempts by bureaucrats to maximize their budget.
In addition, Mueller (2003) suggests that many
of the assumptions necessary for the bureaucracy
theory to hold may be too strong and actually
weaken the ability of the bureaucrat to manipulate
price and output. 
For example, the ability of a bureau to present
a take-it-or-leave-it budget proposal may be less-
ened if the funding agency or an oversight agency
is aware of the advantage such a position affords
the bureau. Thus, the funding agency may request
that the bureau present several cost and output
scenarios; if the bureau must present a cost sched-
ule, it becomes more likely that the bureau will
announce its true costs.18 Also, several agencies
exist, such as the U.S. General Accounting Office,
that are set-up for the sole purpose of detecting
excessive costs and inefficiencies in government
bureaus. The possibility of an audit and the neg-
ative attention such an action brings creates an
incentive for bureaucrats to limit their pricing
power and, at least somewhat, promote an effi-
cient organization.
Although the constraints on bureaucracy
seem reasonable, they are somewhat limited given
the number of local, state, and federal agencies
that exist relative to the number of funding and
oversight agencies. However, although the litera-
ture has presented strong evidence that bureau-
cracy may partly explain government size, much
less work has been done on explaining how
bureaucracy theory may explain government
growth. One explanation put forth by Mueller
(2003) is that the ability of a bureau to misrepre-
sent its cost and/or output schedule is likely to
be directly correlated with the bureau’s size.
Thus, larger bureaus can better manipulate their
budgets relative to smaller bureaus, and any
manipulation of the bureau’s budget will increase
the size of the bureau, which in turn increases
the bureau’s ability to manipulate the budget.
Despite the limits of bureaucracy theory, it
remains a plausible explanation for the scope of
government seen today. The common inefficien-
cies of large organizations, be they private or
public, are not unknown by the general public,
who often work in such organizations. In addition,
it is not uncommon for the media to report waste
or fraud that has occurred at large private and
public organizations. The bureaucracy theory fits
arguably well with the real-world experiences of
many people.
Fiscal Illusion
The fiscal illusion theory assumes that govern-
ment, specifically legislators and the executive
branch, can deceive voters as to the true size of
government. This theory is similar to the bureau-
cracy theory that postulated that bureaus can
deceive legislators and funding agencies as to
the true size of the bureau. The concept of fiscal
illusion has been discussed in the economics liter-
ature for nearly a century, but Buchanan (1967)
formulates the idea into a theory of government
size and growth.
Fiscal illusion assumes that citizens measure
the size of government by the quantity of taxes
they pay. As such, taxes and tax collection meas-
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18 Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985) show that a bureau can
charge a price higher than the efficient level (marginal costs =
marginal benefits) only when the demand for the bureau’s service
is inelastic.ures that are less obvious to citizens are more
likely to be used by government. Examples
include the federal withholding of income taxes
and property tax collection through monthly
mortgage payments. Although the income tax is
considered a direct tax, versus indirect taxes
such as gasoline or cigarette taxes, the ability of
direct taxes to be disguised suggests that the col-
lection method of some direct taxes may hide
citizens’ tax bills better than indirect taxes.
Mueller (2003, p. 527) suggests that determining
which taxes are hidden from citizens is largely
an empirical issue.
Oates (1988) provides an overview of the
empirical literature on fiscal illusion. He summa-
rizes the empirical findings and develops five
hypotheses to support the fiscal illusion theory
of government. Oates (1988) concludes (i) tax
burdens are more difficult to evaluate when the
tax structure is more complicated, (ii) progressive
tax structures that increase a citizen’s tax bill
according to income increases are less obvious
than legislated changes to the tax code, (iii) home-
owners are better able to judge their portion of
property taxes than are renters, (iv) the issuance
of debt (and thus the likelihood of future tax
increases) appears less costly to voters than cur-
rent tax increases, and (v) the “fly-paper effect”
of government spending is real.
The fly-paper effect hypothesis deserves some
explanation given the attention it has received
in the literature (see Hines and Thaler, 1995).
Economic theory predicts that a lump-sum
increase in income to one level of government
from another, say a lump-sum grant from the
federal government to a state government, will
increase government spending by the same
amount as would an equal increase in citizen
income in that state. Increases in income (revenue
via taxes) or grants to the voter’s government are
identical because they both increase financial
resources to the government. Government sets
the level of expenditures desired by the median
voter. Thus, when grant monies are obtained by
the government, the voter can consider these
grant funds as an increase in personal income
via a reduction in taxes. Thus, through an efficient
political process, any additional revenue from
grants is offset by a decrease in tax revenue
demanded by voters. 
Typically, a $1 increase in personal income
increases government spending by $0.05 to
$0.10.19 In the absence of a fly-paper effect, one
should expect to see every $1 from a lump-sum
grant to state governments (an income increase
to state governments) increase government spend-
ing by the same amount, $0.05 to $0.10. However,
the literature has shown that lump-sum grants
increase government spending by $0.20 to $1 for
every $1 in grant money, which is significantly
greater than the $0.05 to $0.10 increase that would
arise from an increase in median voter income.20
Thus, the grant-money “sticks” to where it is sent,
hence the term fly-paper effect. Inefficiencies in
the political process and a disconnect between
the preferences of the median voter and govern-
ment are cited as reasons why the fly-paper effect
may exist. If the fly-paper effect exists, then gov-
ernments can increase spending without apparent
tax increases. Increases in intergovernmental
grants will need to be financed by taxes, but this
tax revenue (and resulting tax burden on citizens)
is not directly linked to the expenditures by the
state governments.
The fly-paper effect and the broader issue of
fiscal illusion are not without critics. Doubters of
the fly-paper effect argue that incorrect modeling
of empirical models and the political processes
in the public sector as well as the failure to discern
between numerous types of grants may explain the
fly-paper effect found in the literature (Hamilton,
1983, and Chernick, 1979).21 Regarding fiscal
illusion, the literature does not explain exactly
how government will grow if fiscal illusion is
indeed present. Just because voters are unaware
19 Hines and Thaler (1995) and Fisher (1996).
20 Hines and Thaler (1995) summarize the results of numerous studies
that present empirical estimates of the fly-paper effect. 
21 Grants can be lump-sum, matching (where the receiving government
must match a certain percent of the expenditure), closed-ended,
or open-ended. Whereas a lump-sum grant only creates an income
effect, a matching grant creates both an income effect and a substi-
tution effect. Economic theory predicts that matching grants will
result in higher government spending than lump-sum grants (see
Fisher, 1996, Chap. 9). Disentangling the effects of various forms
of grants greatly complicates empirical analyses on the fly-paper
effect.
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a clear method for government officials (legisla-
tors, bureaucrats) to take advantage of this situa-
tion to increase the size of government. Mueller
(2003) argues that, for fiscal illusion to explain
government size and growth, it must be combined
with other theories of government growth dis-
cussed earlier to form a single model of govern-
ment growth.
Monopoly Government and Leviathan
The idea that representative governments
behave as monopolists was first suggested by
Breton (1974). The party in control of the legisla-
ture has an objective function that includes the
probability of reelection, personal pecuniary gain,
and the pursuit of personal ideals. While provid-
ing basic public goods, such as police and fire
protection (in the case of a local government),
the monopoly government can obtain its objec-
tives by bundling narrowly defined issues that
benefit individual members of the government
along with the more popular public-good services
provided.
This idea stems from the neoclassical view
of the monopolist, where a private monopolist
can increase his profit by bundling other products
that he does not monopolize with his monopolist
product. Consumers will then buy the monopo-
list’s package as long as their consumer surplus
on the bundled products exceeds the cost of the
individual packages.
In the case of governments, this bundling of
services results in higher levels of government
output. Tullock (1959) provides a comprehensive
analysis of how the bundling of goods and vote-
trading among legislators can increase the size of
government. The example shown in Table 2 illus-
trates the point made by Tullock (1959): A five
member legislature is considering the three proj-
ects, each of which is inefficient because the net
costs outweigh the net benefits.22 As a result, if
each project was voted on separately (and each
legislator voted according to the preferences of
his constituency), then none of the projects would
be implemented because each would lose by a 4-
to-1 margin. But, bundling the three projects will
garner “yes” votes from legislators representing
districts A, B, and C, thus allowing the legislation
to pass 3-to-2, thereby increasing the size of gov-
ernment expenditures.
The monopolist view of government has been
extended further by Brennan and Buchanan
(1977, 1980). In their model of a “leviathan” gov-
ernment, the monopoly government’s sole objec-
tive is to maximize revenue. The citizenry is
assumed to have lost all control over their govern-
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22 As noted in Gwartney and Stroup (1997, p. 503), vote-trading and
bundling can also lead to efficient measures. The point made in the
above example is that bundling can lead to greater government size.
Table 2
Vote Trading, Bundling, and Government Size
Net Benefits (+) or Costs (–) to Each Voter in District
Construction of  Construction of 
Voters of district post office in A Dredging harbor in B military base in C Total
A +$10 –$3 –$3 +$4
B –$3 +$10 –$3 +$4
C –$3 –$3 +$10 +$4
D –$3 –$3 –$3 –$9
E –$3 –$3 –$3 –$9
Total –$2 –$2 –$2 –$6
SOURCE: Gwartney and Stroup (1997, p. 503).ment, and political competition is seen as an inef-
fective constraint on the growth of government.23
Their leviathan view of government is opposite
of the government assumed in the citizen-over-
state theories—the latter being a benevolent
provider of goods, a reducer of externalities, and
a redistributor of income. According to Brennan
and Buchanan (1977), only constitutional con-
straints on the government’s authority to tax and
issue debt can limit a leviathan government.24
Empirical evidence for the monopoly view
of government has provided mixed results. The
studies are often conducted at the local rather
than national level due to data availability. Many
tests for monopoly government have a similar
goal as those for the bureaucracy theory, namely
that the cost of public services is greater than the
costs of identical services provided by the private
sector. Additional research has hypothesized
that a constraint on a monopoly government is
competition from neighboring governments
(Martin and Wagner, 1978). This research on the
monopoly power of government has shown that
restrictions on incorporation raise the costs of
existing local governments. 
Tests for leviathan government begin with
the premise that such a system should be less
likely to occur when government is relatively
smaller and there exists strong intergovernmental
competition. As with the studies of monopoly,
much of the literature on leviathan has focused
on local governments (Oates, 1972, Nelson, 1987,
and Zax, 1989). The mixed results obtained in
these studies are due, at least in part, to the vari-
ety of methods authors use to proxy for govern-
ment size. On the national level, Oates (1985)
finds that countries having a federalist constitu-
tion (many levels of government) had a negative,
but insignificant, effect on government growth.
Much more empirical testing must be done before
the leviathan view of government is broadly
accepted as one plausible explanation for govern-
ment growth.
A NOTE ON THE 16TH 
AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
Prior to the adoption of the 16th amendment
to the U.S. Constitution in 1913, the federal gov-
ernment was constrained from directly taxing
personal income by Article 1, Section 9 of the
U.S. Constitution, which reads as follows: “No
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken.” A careful reading of
this clause reveals that the federal government
actually could levy a personal income tax (which
is a direct tax) prior to the 16th amendment, but
income tax collection had to be in apportionment
to population.
The 16th amendment negated the apportion-
ment clause written in Article 1, Section 9. The
16th amendment reads as follows: “The Congress
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever sources derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”
The 16th amendment was passed by Congress on
July 2, 1909, and ratified on February 3, 1913.25
What makes this amendment interesting with
regard to government growth is that the dramatic
rise in the size of the federal government (see
Figure 1) began immediately following the ratifi-
cation of the 16th amendment.
The option to levy a federal income tax that
is made available to Congress does not itself imply
25 For an interesting history of the 16th amendment, see National
Archives and Records Administration (1995) and 
www.ourdocuments.gov (keyword search “16th amendment”).
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23 This is a result of the rational ignorance of voters (voters don’t
care about the political process because the costs of doing so out-
weigh any benefit from their single vote) and collusion by elected
officials.
24 A revenue-maximizing government will typically not maximize
revenue at a 100 percent tax rate because a tax base shrinks as tax
rates increase. Consider the following: T = r · B(r), where T = tax
revenue, r = tax rate, and B = tax base. Differentiating tax revenue
(T) with respect to the tax rate (r) and manipulating terms gives
the expression
.
This expression shows that tax revenues will be maximized when
the elasticity of the tax base is equal to –1. If the elasticity is less
than –1, then an increase in the rate will decrease the base by a
larger amount, thereby decreasing revenue. On the other hand, if
the elasticity is greater than –1, then an increase in the rate will







. – = 1that government will grow. The option to tax
personal income means only that government
has another source of revenue with on which to
finance its growth. Explaining government growth
must be done using the theories presented earlier—
income taxes are simply a fuel that enables the
engine of government growth to start. 
However, the government has increased its
reliance on federal income taxes over the past 90
years, the same time period in which government
expenditures have increased dramatically. Personal
income tax revenue as a percentage of all federal
tax revenue increased from about 2 percent in
1913 to over 43 percent in 2004. Also, because
of large exemptions, few people paid personal
income taxes in 1913; if they did pay taxes, the
rates were much lower than today. For example,
in 1913 the lowest tax bracket was $0 to $20,000,
with a 1 percent marginal tax rate; the highest
bracket was on taxable income over $500,000,
taxed at a 7 percent rate; and the personal married
exemption was $4,000. In 2004 dollars, the lowest
1913 bracket and married exemption would be
equal to $381,616 and $76,323, respectively, and
the top 1913 bracket would be equal to a 2004
income of $10,495,000.26 Compare this with actual
2004 tax statistics: The married exemption (no
children) was $6,200, the lowest tax bracket was
10 percent on taxable income up to $7,150, and
the top marginal tax rate was 35 percent on taxable
income over $319,100.27 Although the strength
of any causality between the 16th amendment
and later expansions of the income tax must be
determined empirically, the strong correlation
between these two events is compelling.28
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The past 90 years has seen a dramatic rise in
the size and growth of the government in the
United States. This article presented various data
illustrating this increase in government growth
and then focused on several economic theories
that attempt to explain this growth. The theories
fit into one of two philosophies of government
growth: either (i) the growth of government is
driven by citizen demand or (ii) the growth in
government is a result of government itself,
brought on by inherent inefficiencies in the public
sector, the personal incentives of public officials,
and representative democracy.
The theories discussed in this article are not
the only theories on government growth that have
been raised. Researchers have suggested that elec-
toral cycles, in conjunction with citizen demand,
may play a role in the size and growth of govern-
ment (Downs, 1957, and Coughlin, 1992). The
expansion of the voting franchise, an arguably
more controversial explanation for government
growth, was suggested by Meltzer and Richard
(1981); their idea is that groups of individuals
that were given the right to vote were typically
from the lower end of the income distribution
and demanded greater government services. 
Although each theory was presented here as
a stand-alone explanation for government size
and growth, the complexity of the public sector
and the political process as well as the limits of
empirical economic analysis suggest that govern-
ment growth is likely to be a function of some or
all of the above theories. In addition, many of
the theories do a better job at either explaining
size or growth, but do not adequately explain the
current size of government or its growth over time.
Some of the theories have not withstood empirical
tests, and debate continues as to whether this is
a result of incorrect theory or incorrect empirical
modeling. The challenge for economists and
political scientists is to formulate a single cohe-
sive theory that accounts for all aspects of the
citizen-over-state and state-over-citizen theories
presented here.
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